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    We owe them a thorough and professional investigation under law. That’s what this is. The American people should expect nothing less from the FBI.

    Oh that’s why the Feeb did a “a reckless and forensically unsound password change” on the phone’s iCloud account? That’s what “professional” means?

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      What’s the point of the password change? Why can’t they just subpoena all the info on the servers?

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        The purpose elucidated by their letter justifying the action (linked from the above, here for convenience) was that it allowed the phone’s owners (not the shooters - it was a work phone) to access the existing backups. The letter does not raise the possibility of a subpoena to Apple.

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          That letter makes it sound like they reset the iCloud password to get at the backups without judicial oversight. I suppose if the employer / owner of the AppleId email was cooperating, that’s not too bad? Still, an interesting precedent.

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            Yeah, they did nothing wrong in asking to have it reset, but it leaves them in the position of having to argue that they’re incompetent, because the alternative is that they’re completely disingenuous (which is not actually proven as a matter of law, after all).

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      We simply want the chance, with a search warrant, to try to guess the terrorist’s passcode without the phone essentially self-destructing and without it taking a decade to guess correctly. That’s it. We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land.

      “We simply want to force Apple to create malware that compromises their iPhone product’s encryption, not break the encryption.”

      That this is even possible is also a problem. I filed rdar://24764014, “iPhone should not be hackable by anyone without PIN”.

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        Glad you did it! I think, and want to believe, that in the wake of this case “against” the FBI, Apple will focus even more energy on taking away themself in the equation when it comes to security of the devices, locking the devices down for even them to have even a shot of accessing it (updating firmware to make brute forcing easier, as in the current case). The only one holding the sacred key is the user, and even Apple can’t apply update to the devices without the users key. That will make a case like this impossible in the future if those means were implemented, and it would make people privy to security and privacy to buy even more Apple stuff. Win-win for everyone except people who want to access other peoples data, as I see it.

        UPDATE: Of course, until the source code of the OSs is available for anybody to audit, no one can be fully assured that the security and privacy measures that Apple says are in place, are actually anything but hot air.

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          Had to look up what rdar is. Apparently it’s the official mechanism Apple uses for bug and other types of reports. Is that right?

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            That is right. I hate that tool.

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              Radar is the Apple internal bug tracking system. It is terrible.

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            You can tell this is total bullshit by the emotional-string-pulling everywhere in the text.

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              Does anyone have a link to the briefs actually being filed? These tidbits seem to be a little PR-heavy.

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                Aside from the lacking of credibility as posted http://blog.easydns.org/2016/02/22/the-us-government-has-no-credibility-to-compel-anybody-to-weaken-security/. There is absolutely no indication that the FBI or any other TLA government institution is either capable or willing to use the information they are collecting to “protect the American public.” With all the data they ARE collecting they are doing a piss poor job of anything. No matter what happens with that phone, those 14 dead are not coming back.