1. 10
  1.  

  2. 5

    There was some chatter about how Facebook was able to generate a random key that gave them a .onion address of facebookcorewwwi.onion, because typically people have only been able to pick a short prefix (using something like shallot), as in the case of the original Silk Road being at silkroad6ownowfk.onion. The concern being if Facebook has the cycles available to generate such a specific key, some other more powerful entity can just as easily generate a key to match any .onion address and MITM it on the Tor network.

    Roger chimed in to say that Facebook generated a bunch of keys with a prefix of “facebook” (which is fairly easy to do) and just picked one that looked the best, which was “facebook core www i”, and that generating a full key that matches another .onion address is still extremely difficult.

    It’s interesting that Facebook’s hidden service has a valid SSL certificate with these alt names:

     DNS Name: facebookcorewwwi.onion
     DNS Name: fbcdn23dssr3jqnq.onion
     DNS Name: fbsbx2q4mvcl63pw.onion
    
    1. 2

      the fact they got a CA to give them an .onion certificate is a little strange

      1. 1

        Another piece of trivia is that both fbcdn.com and fbsbx.com (used as the prefix of the final two DNS entries) are registered by Facebook and redirect to facebook.com.