“We do not know how to build an internet voting system that has all of the security and privacy and transparency and verifiability properties that a national security application like voting has to have,” said David Jefferson, a researcher at the Center for Applied Scientific Computing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and vice-chair of the board of directors at Verified Voting.
We do not know how to build an in-person voting system that has those properties. We have never had those properties.
Granted, an online voting system has threats for which we are completely unprepared, no matter how strongly I might feel that the ideal architecture is pretty clear - the centerpiece would need to be a national registry of citizens' public keys. But that will not happen until security is the actual goal rather than only the stated one.
Of course this is a horrible idea until that happy day.
There’s this cultural notion I’ve observed wherein we demand more of mechanized/computerized systems than we do of human systems. That is, we accept that error and failure happen in human systems and forgive them, if somewhat reluctantly, to a reasonable extent. But if a computer system (ya know, one that humans built) makes a mistake, it’s immediately a failure.
It’s like we need to build things to protect us from ourselves.
Automated systems have large scale failure modes that human systems don’t have. Ever see the Sorcerer’s Apprentice in Fantasia? Even the dumbest of humans will step fetching water when it starts overflowing onto the floor. I think it’s reasonable to demand assurances/perfection in proportion to the potential for damage.
100 times, this.
In-person voting systems are less secure than even a trivial electronic implementation when it comes to a single vote.
Scaling electoral fraud to the thousands of votes required to impact an election is more costly and has a higher risk of detection in a physical system.
What about this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDnShu5V99s
There’s this too: