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    Your two submissions make me think David A Wheeler’s summary of SCM security is still timely since the [D]VCS’s on average aren’t built with strong security in architecture or implementation. The only two I know that tried in architecture/design at least were Aegis and especially Shapiro et al’s OpenCM:

    http://aegis.sourceforge.net/propaganda/security.html

    https://web.archive.org/web/20070623124209/http://www.opencm.org/docs.html

    Both are defunct since they didn’t get popular. I think it would be beneficial for someone to apply the thinking in Wheeler’s summary and linked papers (esp on high-assurance) to modern DVCS to see what they have and don’t have. Plus the feasibility of strong implementation. I think my design in the past was just the standard mediating and logging proxy in front of a popular VCS with append-only logs of the code itself. A default for when you have nothing better.

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      I think that’s rather orthogonal. The problem is everybody implemented a “run more commands” feature which runs more commands. It’s not really about the integrity of the code in the repo.

      In a sense, yes, if the repo was a read only artifact everything would be safer. But somehow we decided that repos need to be read/execute artifacts with embedded commands in them. Behold, the “smart” repo. Crypto signing that doesn’t make it safer.

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        I’ve seen the “dumb” source control tool - speed is a feature, and without a “smart” transport layer of some kind your push/pull or checkin/checkout times become pretty awful. Just compare CVS-via-pserver to Subversion, or tla to bzr.

        The thing that’s surprising to me is that it took well over a decade for anyone to notice this problem, since it’s been present in Subversion all these years…

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          My takeaway is that argv parsing is too fragile to serve as an API contract. And I doubt very much this is the first and only bug of its kind.

          If SSH transport had been implemented with calls to some SSH library instead of a fork+exec to an external ‘ssh’ program, this bug would not have happened as it did.

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            Oh, absolutely argv is too fragile. I’m surprised even considering that this bug survived so long.