Finally comes full circle. In the past, there were rules saying you couldn’t bring certain cell phones within close distance of a STU-III secure telephone because the signals from cellphone would bounce the secrets out of STU-III’s memory. Anyone just walking close to one with a cell on compromised that phone. Now, they’re using an emanation attack to leak secrets directly to a nearby cell phone.
Also, it’s Elovici’s people again. Anyone that likes this stuff should look at basically anything they do. They’re the reigning champs of the public sphere. Hard to say how far behind or ahead since most attacks like this are classified in U.S., U.K., and Russia.
Note: I didn’t read the paper; I just skimmed for the concept.
Does this mean somebody could create a “soft” stingray out of a desktop computer running some malware and then use that to root the vulnerability-ridden basebands of nearby cellphones?
If such exploits require receiving data from the phone, then I’ll presume the answer is a hard “no”, because I presume the paper presents a method of bit-banging RAM to generate that GSM signal but I also presume that it doesn’t present any way for an unadorned desktop PC to receive GSM signals…