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    Good gravy, my eyes. That site’s style screams “I hate you, reader”

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      This blog entry follows Betteridge’s Rule of Headlines and it isn’t worth reading.

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        tl;dr: no they cannot!

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          no, but their approach to not doing so is quite entertaining.

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          I enjoyed this fun screed. Long live SPARC.

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            Long live OpenSPARC: the original, FOSS CPU’s. Still around as Leon3, T1, and T2. PITON builds on one.

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            I don’t think I’ve every heard of James Gosling being referred to as “goosehead mccoy”…

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              anyway, i’d bet the interview process for oracle managers involves dispatching a weeping child with a rusty boat knife to prove that you fit well with their corporate culture and philosophy.

              Makes sense. Back in ‘05, as a newly minted 3C0x2, I was informed by a DoD colleague that Oracle’s basic confidence trick was to use lobbying to create policy that mandated the use of software that only Oracle could provide–usually by putting the same fictitious feature in both the requirements and the product.

              Take a moment to consider actually pulling that off. Yep, it takes a special breed…

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                They, Microsoft, and IBM also helped destroy high-assurance security using same tricks for procurement. The mandate to use as much COTS as possible despite its intentionally low quality/security pushed out high-assurance suppliers. That plus NSA competing with them via MISSI.

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                  MISSI

                  “Multi-level Information Systems Security Initiative”?

                  I websearch’d and found a page on jproc.ca. The .ca makes me wonder if that’s the right page. Do you have a good link for those not familiar with MISSI?

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                    Most links to that stuff I had are dead. The Old Web is in perpetual decay. Here’s a summary of what they were building which overlapped considerably with what private sector was building under TCSEC requirements. That made their stuff redundant and competing with very organization that would certify it. High risk, low reward.

                    Bell of Bell-LaPadula gave a great overview of the beginning, middle, and end of the Computer Security Initiative. The results show the CSI model worked for security regulation: the combo of clear standards and financial incentives led to market immediately producing secure systems when they mostly hadnt in past. Those were also more secure than many systems today.

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                “to be quite honest to you i do not know if there is immediately-related reasons as to why java bytecode runs well on SPARC machines, but i’d be happy to answer that question for you for $35”